Adversarial decision-making: Choosing between models constructed by interested parties by Froeb, Luke M. et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Adversarial decision-making: Choosing
between models constructed by
interested parties
Luke M. Froeb and Bernhard Ganglmair and Steven
Tschantz
Vanderbilt University, University of Texas at Dallas, Vanderbilt
University
28 March 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/71501/
MPRA Paper No. 71501, posted 1 June 2016 04:42 UTC
Adversarial Decision-Making: Choosing1
Between Models Constructed by Interested2
Parties∗3
Luke M. Froeb† Bernhard Ganglmair‡ Steven Tschantz§4
March 28, 20165
Abstract6
In this paper, we characterize adversarial decision-making as a choice7
between competing interpretations of evidence (“models”) constructed8
by interested parties. We show that if a court cannot perfectly deter-9
mine which party’s model is more likely to have generated the evidence,10
then adversaries face a tradeoff: a model further away from the best11
(most likely) interpretation has a lower probability of winning, but also12
a higher payoff following a win. We characterize equilibrium when both13
adversaries construct optimal models, and use the characterization to14
compare adversarial decision-making to an inquisitorial benchmark. We15
find that adversarial decisions are biased, and the bias favors the party16
with the less-likely, and more extreme, interpretation of the evidence.17
Court bias disappears when the court is better able to distinguish be-18
tween the likelihoods of the competing models, or as the amount of19
evidence grows.20
JEL classification: C72; D74; K4121
Keywords: adversarial justice; evidence-based decision-making; expert testimony;22
inquisitorial justice; litigation; persuasion games; science vs. advocacy.23
∗An earlier version of this paper was circulated under the title “A Theory of Competitive
Framing.”
†Vanderbilt University, Owen Graduate School of Management, 401 21st Avenue South,
Nashville, TN 37203, USA. e-mail: luke.froeb@owen.vanderbilt.edu
‡The University of Texas at Dallas, Naveen Jindal School of Management, 800 W. Camp-
bell Rd. (SM31), Richardson, TX 75080, USA. e-mail: ganglmair@utdallas.edu
§Vanderbilt University, Department of Mathematics, Nashville, TN 37240, USA. e-mail:
tschantz@math.vanderbilt.edu
1 Introduction24
Adversarial justice has two stages: (i) information provision, where informa-25
tion is acquired and reported to the court; and (ii) decision-making, where26
a court makes a decision to resolve the dispute (Iossa and Palumbo, 2007).27
Much of the economic literature comparing adversarial to inquisitorial justice28
focuses on the first stage, where evidence is produced and reported by adver-29
saries, rather than an impartial third party (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; Shin,30
1998; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999; Froeb and Kobayashi, 2001; Daughety and31
Reinganum, 2000b; Skaperdas and Vaidya, 2012; Froeb and Kobayashi, 2012;32
Rantakari, 2016). Although these articles address different aspects of the ad-33
versarial system, they all find that competition between the adversaries plays34
a crucial role in the ability of a court to gather information.35
However, the adversarial system also differs from the inquisitorial in the36
second, decision-making stage: instead of having to choose between competing37
interpretations of evidence constructed by interested parties (“adversarial”), a38
court can instead appoint a neutral expert to interpret the evidence for them39
(“inquisitorial”). A shift to the second option is probably the most commonly40
called-for reform of the (adversarial) justice system in the United States (Fien-41
berg and Straf, 1991; Froeb and Kobayashi, 2001; Wagner, 2005), especially42
for scientific or statistical evidence where the court often lacks “knowledge43
and expertise . . . and therefore has to delegate the job to a qualified expert”44
(Ambrus et al., 2015). For example, antitrust merger trials often involve oppos-45
ing expert economists who construct oligopoly models to predict post-merger46
prices (Werden and Froeb, 1994; Tenn et al., 2010). Lay competition tribunals47
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are called on to assess the relative credibility of the two models, even though48
constructing a model would be beyond the tribunal’s capability.49
More generally, think about two litigants preparing for trial. Evidence has50
already been produced and discovered, and the opposing attorneys are devising51
strategies to win in court. As first-year law students are taught (Tanford,52
2009):53
It is your job to sort the information before trial, organize it, sim-54
plify it and present it to the jury in a simple model that explains55
what happened and why you are entitled to a favorable verdict.56
Remember that there is a lawyer on the other side who will be57
trying to sell the jury a story that contradicts yours. . . . If both58
sides do competent jobs, the jury will have to choose between two59
competing versions of events . . . .[emphasis added]60
In this paper, we characterize the resulting trial as a persuasion game.161
Unlike other persuasion games, where agents have private information and62
take actions to persuade a principal (i.e., by strategically revealing evidence),63
in our game, all the evidence is known, and litigants compete by proposing64
models to explain what it means.265
1Our persuasion game assumes symmetric information across all players. Scenarios in
which two agents with private information (and potentially competing interests) try to
influence a decision-making principal have been studied by Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989),
Glazer and Rubinstein (2001), Krishna and Morgan (2001a), Krishna and Morgan (2001b),
Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016), and Rantakari (2016).
2In the context of litigation, Mauet (2007:24) describes such a model or theory of a case
as a “simple story of ‘what really happened’.” This kind of decision-making could also be
motivated by institutional constraints, like the constitutional guarantees of the adversarial
process. The Case and Controversy Clause of the U.S. Constitution (art. III, sec. 2) limits
the court to deciding actual controversies, which are framed by the litigants.
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Deciding between the competing interpretations of the evidence is analo-66
gous to the statistical problem of “model selection,” where a researcher ob-67
serves data, and then tries to determine which of two models generated it. If68
we think of the court as a researcher and the evidence as data, then the adver-69
saries’ models can be parameterized as probability distributions that describe70
the evidence-generating process. The court measures the “credibility” of each71
model by its statistical likelihood and decides in favor of the most likely model.72
This decision rule puts adversaries on the horns of a dilemma: a model73
with a “location” (mean) further from the evidence is less likely to prevail but74
has a higher payoff if it does. We use distribution families that also have a75
“spread” (variance) parameter, which makes credibility (likelihood) a choice76
variable. For example, a player can reduce the likelihood penalty (credibility77
cost) of choosing a model with a location further from the evidence by also78
choosing a model with a bigger spread. A bigger spread makes it more likely79
that the evidence would be located far from the mean, which is equivalent to80
saying that evidence is not very informative about the mean.81
If the court can, through the process of discovery and rebuttal, perfectly82
rank the likelihoods of the two competing models, then competition between83
the adversaries forces each party to propose the same, most likely model. This84
is because any “shading” (i.e., interpretation of the evidence away from the85
most likely model) can be bested by a more likely model with a higher expected86
payoff. This leads to an equilibrium in which each party chooses the same,87
most likely model. In other words, competition between the adversaries leads88
the court to the best interpretation of the evidence, even though it has to89
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choose between interpretations constructed by interested parties. A similar90
result comes from final-offer arbitration, where parties make the same utility91
maximizing offer (Crawford, 1979).92
If, instead, the court measures likelihood with error and, as a result, cannot93
perfectly determine which party’s model is more likely to have generated the94
evidence, then each party shades its model away from the most likely model.95
Bias arises if the likelihood is not symmetric, which changes the tradeoff96
between credibility and payoff for each of the parties. As a result, each party97
“shades” its model away from the most likely model by differing amounts. In98
this case, equilibrium decisions are biased, and the bias favors the party with99
the less likely, and more extreme, interpretation. As such, there is no reason100
to expect the court’s decision to have desirable properties, even when based on101
evidence. However, bias disappears as the court gets better at distinguishing102
between the likelihoods of competing models, or as the amount of evidence103
grows.104
We present our main results using a simple litigation game. We introduce105
the model and notation in Section 2 and illustrate our main results using a106
parameterized version of the model in Section 3. In the Technical Appendix,107
we generalize the model and provide more formal statements of our results.108
We conclude this paper with a brief discussion in Section 4.109
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2 Litigation as a Persuasion Game110
Imagine that a plaintiff (P ) sues a defendant (D), and the issue before the111
court is the level of damages.3 Before trial, evidence z¯ = (z1, z2, ..., zn) is112
produced and discovered. We parameterize the evidence-generating process113
so that the level of damages corresponds to the mean µ
Z
≥ 0 of an unknown114
distribution Z belonging to some family F . Such a distribution Z can be115
interpreted as a model that explains the evidence and how it relates to the116
damages. We assume there is a unique model Z
ML
∈ F that best explains the117
evidence (has the highest likelihood given the evidence z¯):118
Z
ML
≡ arg max
Z∈F
L (Z|z¯) (1)
where L (Z|z¯) = ∏ni=1 f(zi|Z). The level of damages associated with the most119
likely model is µ
ML
.120
In this litigation game, both parties simultaneously offer competing models,121
ZP ∈ F and ZD ∈ F , to explain the evidence and the respective level of122
damages. The court (as the decision-maker in this contest) evaluates the123
model likelihoods LP = Pr(ZP |z¯) and LD = Pr(ZD|z¯) and awards damages124
of µ
P
≥ 0 or µ
D
≥ 0. The expected payment from the defendant to the plaintiff125
is126
µˆ = θµ
P
+
(
1− θ)µ
D
(2)
3The results do not change if we fix the level of damages and let the court draw inference
about liability, modeled as a probability of a plaintiff win. In this case, expected damages
are the probability of a plaintiff win times the level of damages.
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where θ is the probability that the court finds in favor of the plaintiff. We127
assume that the court’s payoffs are directly linked to the accuracy of the128
decision.4 In other words, the court’s objective is to get it right, and it therefore129
decides in favor of the party whose model is best supported by the evidence.5130
Note that multiple models can generate the same level of damages (i.e.,131
different distributions have the same mean). Because the plaintiff’s payoffs132
are strictly increasing in µˆ, equation (2) implies that, for any given level of133
damages µ
P
, the plaintiff chooses the strongest model (i.e., with the highest134
likelihood) to maximize the value of θ and thus maximize µˆ. Likewise, the135
defendant (whose payoffs are strictly decreasing in µˆ) chooses the strongest136
model to minimize θ and thus minimize µˆ.6 Optimally chosen models trade137
off a higher payoff following a win for a lower probability of winning.7138
4This can, for instance, be due to career concerns, as in Farber and Bazerman
(1986:1506), who argue that arbitrators “attempt to make awards that maximize the prob-
ability they will be hired in subsequent cases” and compromise to maintain “acceptability
with both parties.” Iossa and Jullien (2012) take an approach similar in spirit. They as-
sume a judge maximizes an external evaluator’s posterior belief about the judge’s correct
(i.e., most credible) decision. Daughety and Reinganum (2000a) model the behavior of a
trial court that is constrained by “higher court review.” See Choi et al. (2012) for related
evidence on federal district judges.
5We interpret the expression in equation (2) as the expectation of the court’s decision,
wherein the court chooses one of the two proposed models by the litigants. Outside of liti-
gation, this approach is akin to final-offer arbitration (Wittman, 1986) or the “closed rule”
in legislation (Austen-Smith, 1993). Our results do not change if, instead, we assume the
court’s damages assessment is the weighted average of the litigants’ claims, where θ is the
weight of the plaintiff’s claim µ
P
. Outside of litigation, this is akin to conventional arbi-
tration, or an “open rule” in legislation, in which the legislative body can amend proposals
submitted.
6Viewed differently, among the models with the same likelihood, the plaintiff chooses the
model that is associated with the highest damages to maximize µˆ, whereas the defendant
chooses the model that is associated with the lowest damages to minimize µˆ. Pardo and
Allen (2008:234) cite evidence suggesting that “juries asume in most cases the parties have
put forward the explanation that best helps their case.”
7The approach taken by Kartik et al. (2007), Kartik (2009), or Emons and Fluet (2009)
is related but differs in one key feature. In their models, players try to sway a decision-maker
by tampering with the evidence at a direct cost, whereas in our setting, the facts are given
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2.1 A Perfect Court as an Inquisitorial Benchmark139
For our benchmark, we suppose the court can perfectly (i.e., without noise)140
rank-order the likelihoods of the parties’ proposed models. The probability of141
a plaintiff win in this case8 is142
θ =

1 for LP > LD
1/2 for LP = LD
0 for LP < LD,
(3)
and the expected payment from the defendant to the plaintiff is143
µˆ =

µ
P
for LP > LD
1/2µ
P
+ 1/2µ
D
for LP = LD
µ
D
for LP < LD.
(4)
With these payoffs, in equilibrium, the adversaries both choose the same,144
most likely model: ZP = ZD = ZML. To see this, note that any model145
proposed by the plaintiff with damages higher (and a likelihood lower) than146
the most likely model ZML gives the defendant an opportunity to choose a more147
likely model (i.e., “closer” to ZML) with lower damages and thus a higher payoff148
for the defendant. A similar argument applies to the plaintiff.9 In equilibrium,149
and litigants try to influence the decision in their favor by tampering with the interpretation
of those facts.
8We assume the court has no ex ante bias favoring one of the two parties. If the likelihoods
are the same, the court tosses a fair coin.
9The defendant’s best response to a plaintiff’s model ZP with µP > µML so that LP <
LML and θ = 1 is a model ZD with a mean µD such that µML ≥ µD and LP < LD ≤ LML
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both parties choose the same, most likely model, and the court awards µ
ML
150
with probability one. Heuristically, the opposing interests of the parties allow151
the court to reach the best (most likely) interpretation of the evidence.152
This outcome of adversarial litigation with a perfect court is also the max-153
imum likelihood estimator whose well-known optimality properties (DeGroot,154
1970) make it an obvious choice for an inquisitorial court with the ability to155
interpret the evidence itself. The maximum likelihood estimator serves as the156
benchmark against which bias is measured. We use the term bias to measure157
deviations from the best (most likely) interpretation or model of the evidence,158
∆µ = µˆ − µ
ML
. In our benchmark case of a perfect court, it does not mat-159
ter whether the court uses inquisitorial or adversarial decision-making because160
both result in the same, best outcome.161
2.2 Noisy Courts162
The characterization of adversarial justice with a perfect court is simple and163
results in an optimal decision, but it cannot explain the salient feature of the164
adversarial system: the competing interpretations of evidence put forward by165
the parties. Adding noise to the court’s decision-making means that the court166
sometimes makes errors by selecting the less likely alternative. Such errors167
make it optimal for the parties to shade their interpretations away from the168
most likely interpretation because there is some probability that a less likely169
claim will be chosen. We motivate the addition of noise with the limited ability170
so that θ = 0. In equilibrium, both parties’ choose the most likely model. A deviation
Z ′s (so that µ
′
s 6= µML) renders the resulting likelihood L ′s < LML and the probability of
winning equal zero.
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of humans (and courts) to “detect signals,”10 as, for instance, in Mueller and171
Weidemann (2008).172
The perceived likelihoods of the proposed models are the product of signal173
and noise:174
L˜P = LP exp ξP and L˜D = LD exp ξD (5)
where ξP and ξD are independently extreme value distributed noise, with mean175
0 and scale 1/λ. The probability of a plaintiff win (i.e., the logit choice proba-176
bility for model P )11 is177
θ˜ = Pr(L˜P > L˜D) =
exp(λ logLP )
exp(λ logLP ) + exp(λ logLD)
=
L λP
L λP +L
λ
D
. (6)
This is similar to the approach taken by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) for mod-178
eling optimal strategies when players make errors in non-cooperative games,12179
and to that taken by McFadden (1974) for modeling consumer choice among180
discrete alternatives.181
The probability in equation (6) is also equivalent to Tullock’s general for-182
10For example, the statistician Irving J. Good, who worked with Alan Turing to break the
Enigma code, thought that a change in an odds ratio from evens to about 5:4 is about as
finely as humans can reasonably perceive their degree of belief in a hypothesis in everyday
use (Good, 1979).
11See Train (2009:36-37,74-75) for the formal steps of deriving expression (6) for a scale
parameter of λ = 1. Our distributional assumption for the random variable ξs is more
restrictive than necessary. For a more general characterization, it suffices to assume that
the random variable ξs (i.e., noise) belongs to the inverse exponential distribution (Jia,
2008).
12The notion of a perfect court without errors, λ→∞, corresponds to a perfectly rational
decision-maker, whereas a noisy court with finite λ is said to be boundedly rational.
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mula for the contest success function in rent-seeking contests (Tullock, 1980),183
with the likelihoodsLs playing the role of “effort.” In our game, a party exerts184
higher effort by choosing a model Zs with a higher likelihood, which results in185
a higher chance of winning.13 This increase in the success probability, however,186
comes at the cost of a lower payoff following a win, because a higher likeli-187
hood Ls implies a location parameter µs closer to the maximum-likelihood188
location µ
ML
. Unlike the standard Tullock contest, payoffs (damages) are not189
exogenous but rather are chosen optimally by the parties.14190
In Table 1, we summarize three special cases of the contest success function191
in equation (6), for different values of the noise parameter λ.15 For λ =192
0, adversarial decision-making is uninformative, and the court’s decision is193
equivalent to a toss of a fair coin where the probability of a plaintiff win is194
θ˜ = 1/2. In this case, the court’s decision is independent of both the players’195
proposed models as well as the evidence.16 For λ = 1, equation (6) becomes196
the lottery version of the general Tullock contest success function. In addition,197
it is equivalent to Bayesian hypothesis testing for a court that assigns equal198
13Others have modeled effort in litigation as the number of arguments presented in court
(Katz, 1988), litigation expenditure (Hirshleifer and Osborne, 2001), or quality of the case
(Baye et al., 2005).
14For contests with endogenous payoffs that depend on parties’ efforts, see, for instance,
Chung (1996), Skaperdas (1996), Konrad and Schlesinger (1997), Kaplan et al. (2002), or
Ambrus et al. (2015). Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011) provide a generalized version of
the Tullock contest that nests a range of contest models, including one in which, as in our
paper, a party i’s effort affects only party i’s but not party j’s payoff.
15Alternative interpretations of the noise parameter λ are found in Skaperdas and Vaidya
(2012:473) (measure of the “sensitivity of the court to the evidence”) and in Hirshleifer and
Osborne (2001) (measure of effectiveness of “legal effort” relative to the (subjective) “power
of truth”).
16This case corresponds to broad jury instructions in Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001:174).
In this scenario, the litigants’ “power of advocacy” (i.e., persuasion) is diminished, and the
outcome of litigation is based entirely on an objective fault parameter, independent of the
litigants’ proposed models.
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Table 1: Litigation Contest Success Function With Noisy Court
λ = 0 Coin toss; uninformative decision-making
λ = 1 Tullock lottery; Bayesian hypothesis testing
λ→∞ Perfect Court benchmark; all-pay auction
prior weight to the competing models of the parties (Saks and Neufeld, 2011;199
Cheng, 2013). After seeing the evidence, the court updates its beliefs about200
which party is correct using Bayes’ rule. The posterior odds are equal to the201
prior odds times the likelihood ratio,202
θ˜
1− θ˜ =
γ
1− γ ·
LP
LD
where γ is the prior weight the court places on the plaintiff’s model (before203
seeing the evidence). Setting the prior weight γ = 1/2 (so that the court is204
unbiased from an ex ante point of view) and rearranging, we get:205
θ˜ =
LP
LP +LD
(7)
which is equivalent to equation (6) for λ = 1.206
For the third scenario in Table 1, as λ→∞, the court can perfectly assess207
the relative likelihoods of the parties’ models, and so awards the item to the208
more likely model with probability one. This is our benchmark case of a perfect209
court and is essentially a first-price all-pay auction (Baye et al., 1996).210
The court’s decision is an estimator of the mean, a likelihood-weighted211
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average of the means of the parties’ models,212
µˆ(ZP , ZD) = θ˜µP +
(
1− θ˜)µ
D
=
L λP · µP +L λD · µD
L λP +L
λ
D
. (8)
The estimator depends on the evidence and on λ, the variance of the noise in213
the court’s assessment of likelihood.214
This award µˆ = µˆ(ZP , ZD) also minimizes a quadratic loss function, that215
is, the weighted sum of the squared deviations of decision µˆ from the parties’216
proposed damages µs: wP (µP + µˆ)
2 − wD (µD − µˆ)2. This latter approach is217
similar to the one used by Farber and Bazerman (1986) to determine the “ap-218
propriate” or “ideal” award in conventional arbitration. Unlike their approach,219
however, our weights are endogenous and driven by the tradeoff of a higher220
payoff following a win for a lower probability of winning.221
The court’s decision is simply a binomial random variate with probability222
p = θ˜ and variance223
Var(µˆ) = θ˜
(
1− θ˜)(µ
P
− µ
D
)2
. (9)
The further apart the locations of the adversaries’ models are, and the closer224
θ˜ is to 1/2, the larger the variance of the court’s decision is.17225
17This assumes that the court chooses either µ
P
or µ
D
. None of our results on bias
change if the court splits the baby by awarding the expected value of the estimate instead,
θ˜µ
P
+
(
1− θ˜)µ
D
. The variance of the expected value is, of course, zero.
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3 Equilibrium Results226
We relegate the formal results of the persuasion game to the Technical Ap-227
pendix. In this Section, we illustrate our main results for a parameterized228
version of the model. Evidence z¯ is a vector of n independent draws zi ∈ (0, 1)229
with sample mean µ¯ from the same Beta(α, β) distribution with mean µ =230
E(zi) = α/(α + β) and variance σ
2 = Var(zi) = αβ/[(α + β)
2(1 + α + β)].231
Each party s = P,D chooses a model Zs = (αs, βs) (i.e., the parameters232
for the Beta distribution) to explain the evidence vector z¯, with any desired233
mean 0 < µs < 1 and any variance σ
2
s = µs(1 − µs)/(1 + αs + βs) with234
0 < σ2s < µs(1 − µs). A Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of this zero-sum235
game is a strategy profile (Z∗P , Z
∗
D) such that each party chooses an optimal236
model, given the model chosen by its rival:237
Plaintiff: µˆ(Z∗P , Z
∗
D) ≥ µˆ(ZP , Z∗D) ∀ZP = (αP , βP ) ∈ R2+
Defendant: µˆ(Z∗P , Z
∗
D) ≤ µˆ(Z∗P , ZD) ∀ZD = (αD, βD) ∈ R2+
 (10)
To illustrate our results, we show three different types of experiments: first, we238
fix an evidence vector z¯ = (1/5, 1/2). We characterize the parties’ equilibrium239
models and show how they affect the court’s decision. Second, we show how240
quickly the court’s decision-making improves as the “decision noise” shrinks241
to zero. Third, we show how quickly the court’s decision-making improves as242
the amount of evidence grows, or alternatively, as “sampling noise” shrinks to243
zero. In statistics, the third experiment determines the “consistency” of an244
estimator.245
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In Figure 1, we assume that the variance of the court’s decision noise is246
λ = 1, which makes the court’s decision equivalent to Bayesian hypothesis247
testing, where the court updates its prior belief (about relative merits of the248
two sides) with the likelihood to form a posterior. This assumption allows249
us to graph the court’s posterior belief as a weighted average of the parties’250
models, where the weights are proportional to the likelihoods of each model.251
Note that we are not saying the court uses Bayesian inference, only that for252
λ = 1, the final assessment of the court µˆ is also the mean of a posterior belief,253
as if formed by Bayesian inference.254
Result 1. Both parties “shade” the evidence in their favor so that 0 < µ∗
D
<255
µ
ML
< µ∗
P
< 1.256
In Figure 1, we plot the parties’ equilibrium models, represented by the257
density functions f(z;αs, βs), and the respective means µs when the evidence258
sample consists of two draws, z¯ = (1/5, 1/2). The plaintiff chooses a model with259
a mean that is above the maximum likelihood estimate, while the defendant260
chooses one with a mean that is below it.261
For λ > 0, the plaintiff engages in payoff moderation (e.g., Konrad, 2009),262
essentially trading off a higher payoff following a win for a lower probability of263
winning.18 In panel (a) of Figure 2, for example, we plot the likelihood ratio of264
the plaintiff’s model relative to that of the defendant. The graph shows that,265
in equilibrium, the plaintiff is willing to accept a lower likelihood of winning,266
18Payoff moderation means that neither player chooses a model with extreme means so
that µs ∈ (0, 1). Without the likelihood penalty of shading when λ = 0 so that the court
sides with the plaintiff 50% of the time, irrespective of the parties’ claims, the parties
construct models with the most extreme claims possible so that µs ∈ {0, 1}.
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Figure 1: Parties’ Equilibrium Claims in the Litigation Game
This figure illustrates the equilibrium of the litigation game for evidence z¯ = (1/5, 1/2), indicated by two cross
marks on the horizontal axis. Pieces of evidence zi ∈ (0, 1) are random draws from a Beta(α, β) distribution
with density function f(z;α, β) = 1
B(α,β)
z1−α(1 − z)1−β , where B(α, β) is the Beta function. The dashed
curve represents the density f(z;αP , βP ) of the plaintiff’s equilibrium model; the dotted curve represents
the density f(z;αD, βD) of the defendant’s equilibrium model. The means of the two models are depicted
by the dotted and dashed vertical lines. The mean of the maximum likelihood µML is represented by the
vertical dotted-dashed line. The court’s equilibrium decision µˆ is depicted by the solid vertical line. The
equilibrium is characterized by the following parameters:
αP βP µP σ
2
P αD βD µD σ
2
D θ˜ µˆ µML
2.397 2.326 0.507 0.044 2.026 5.981 0.253 0.021 0.430 0.362 0.349
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
1
2
3
µML
µˆ
µ∗
P
µ∗
D
z
f(z;α, β)
Plaintiff
Defendant
Court
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Figure 2: Payoff Moderation as a Best Response
The figure illustrates the plaintiff’s best response in the litigation game for evidence z¯ = (1/5, 1/2), indicated
by two cross marks on the horizontal axis. In panel (a), we fix the defendant’s equilibrium model Z∗D and
plot the likelihood ratio LP /LD for given values of µP . In panel (b), we fix the defendant’s equilibrium
model Z∗D and derive the plaintiff’s optimal response. We plot the court’s decision µˆ for given values of
mean µP of the plaintiff’s model. In both panels, the vertical lines depict the mean µ
∗
D
of the defendant’s
equilibrium model (dotted) and the mean µ∗
P
of the plaintiff’s equilibrium model (dashed), as well as the
mean of the maximum likelihood (solid).
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
0
0.5
1
1.5
µ∗Pµ
∗
D
µP
LP
LD
(a) Claim vs. L -Ratio
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
0
0.2
0.4 µ
∗
Pµ
∗
D
µP
µˆ
(b) Claim vs. Decision
relative to the most likely model in exchange for a higher payoff following a267
win. Panel (b) of Figure 2 plots the profit function of the plaintiff’s location,268
for a fixed value of Z∗D, the equilibrium model for the defendant. As in panel269
(a), we see that in equilibrium, the plaintiff optimally chooses a mean µ
P
above270
maximum likelihood mean, but strictly less than unity, µ
ML
< µ∗
P
< 1.271
Result 2. The party with less favorable evidence follows an “obfuscation strat-272
egy” and chooses a model with (i) a location further away from the most likely273
model and (ii) with a spread larger than its rival’s.274
For example, the evidence vector z¯ = (1/5, 1/2) in Figure 1 favors the de-275
fendant. In this case, the plaintiff optimally chooses a model with a location276
further from the most likely model |µ∗
P
− µ
ML
| = 0.158 > 0.096 = |µ∗
D
− µ
ML
|,277
and with a higher variance, σ∗P = 0.044 > 0.021 = σ
2
D. We easily see this in278
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Figure 1 by comparing the spread of the density of the plaintiff’s model (large)279
to that of the defendant’s (small). A model with a larger spread is more likely280
to generate evidence further away from its mean.281
The intuition for this result is simple. As long as the sample mean µ¯ 6= 0.5,282
the likelihood is asymmetric, which changes the tradeoff between the proba-283
bility of winning and payoff following a win. For the disfavored party, it lowers284
the likelihood penalty, or “credibility cost,” of claiming a model with a loca-285
tion further from the evidence. Anyone who has participated in litigation or286
has experience in political campaigns will recognize this as analogous to what287
is known as an “obfuscation strategy.” When the evidence goes against you,288
your best move is to claim that the evidence is not very informative. The de-289
fendant’s best response is to choose a model with a mean closer to the evidence290
and with a smaller spread. This might be called an “elucidation strategy,” as291
the defendant is essentially claiming that the evidence is informative about292
the mean.293
Result 3. The court’s assessment of liability is biased in favor of the party294
with, on average, less favorable evidence.295
We illustrate this result in Figure 1, where the evidence favors the defen-296
dant, µ¯ < 1/2, and the court’s decision is just above the maximum likelihood297
estimate, µˆ > µ
ML
. This “bias” favors the plaintiff who, in equilibrium, offers298
a more extreme interpretation of the evidence.19 However, the court’s bias is299
19The general characterization of this result in Theorem A3 in the Technical Appendix
does not explicitly refer to less or more favorable evidence but to the “credibility cost” of
shading the model location away from the most likely model location. For Result 3, if the
evidence is closer to the lower range of the Beta(α, β) distribution (so that the evidence is
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small compared to the widely disparate models of the parties, which give the300
court’s estimator a big variance, as computed in equation (9).301
Result 4. As court noise disappears, λ → ∞, (i) the parties’ models con-302
verge to the maximum likelihood estimator, µs → µML, for s = P,D, as does303
the court’s estimator, µˆ → µ
ML
; and (ii) the probability of a plaintiff win ap-304
proaches 50%, θ˜ → 1/2. The court’s estimator converges faster than do the305
models of the parties.306
For Results 1, 2, and 3, we have kept the court noise parameter constant.307
For Result 4, we vary λ to show how an improvement in the court’s assessment308
of credibility affects the parties’ strategies and the court’s decision. First, note309
that, for λ = 0, adversarial decision-making is uninformative, as the court310
sides with the plaintiff half the time (i.e., θ˜ = 1/2) regardless of the parties’311
claims. This eliminates the credibility cost of an extreme claim, so the parties312
construct models with the most extreme claims possible: µ
D
= 0 and µ
P
= 1.313
As λ increases, the credibility cost of shading their models away from the most314
likely model increases, so the parties shade less.315
We illustrate the convergence in panel (a) of Figure 3, where we plot the316
court’s equilibrium assessment as a function of court’s decision noise param-317
eter. While both the competing models of the adversaries and the court’s318
estimator converge to the maximum likelihood estimate, the court’s estima-319
tor converges faster than do the competing models of the parties.20 As a320
less favorable for the plaintiff), then there is more “room” to explain the evidence with a
larger µ than with a smaller µ. This translates into lower credibility costs for the plaintiff,
resulting in a bias in favor of the plaintiff.
20Note, however, that this convergence is not the usual convergence in probability, which
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Figure 3: Effect of Court Noise
This figure illustrates the relationship between decision-making noise and the equilibrium in the litigation
game with evidence z¯ = (1/5, 1/2). In panel (a), we plot the means of the models for the plaintiff (dashed
curve) and the defendant (dotted curve), the court’s equilibrium decision (solid curve), and the mean of
the maximum likelihood model (dotted-dashed curve) against the noise parameter λ. In panel (b), we plot
the probability of a plaintiff win, θ˜ against λ. In panel (c), we plot the variance of the court’s estimator,
Var(µˆ) = θ˜(1− θ˜) (µP − µD )2 in equation (9) against λ. The horizontal axes are on a logarithmic scale.
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0.015
λ
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(c) Court Variance
court is better able to assess credibility, the parties choose models closer to321
the maximum likelihood estimator, but on either side of it. In this sense, the322
parties’ models tend to cancel each other out, which has a salutary effect on323
the adversarial court’s decision-making.324
In panel (b) of Figure 3, we plot the probability θ˜ of a plaintiff win as325
λ → ∞. As court noise disappears, the parties choose models that have326
the same likelihoods (as their models converge to the maximum likelihood327
estimator), so the probability of a win approaches 1/2. This limit corresponds328
to the 50% probability of a trial win found by Priest and Klein (1984), albeit329
for a different reason. Their explanation is built around a selection bias story330
driven by overconfidence (Nalebuff, 1987). In our model, the equilibrium 50%331
tells us whether or not an estimator is “consistent.” Rather, it is convergence to the best
(i.e., most likely) interpretation of the evidence. There is still sampling error because the
maximum likelihood estimator still has variance, but the adversarial court will reach the
same, most likely explanation as an inquisitorial court.
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Figure 4: Effect of More Evidence
This figure illustrates the results for varying evidence sample sizes n. Evidence zi ∈ (0, 1) are independent
draws from a Beta(1, 2) with µ = 1/3 and σ2 = 1/18. For evidence sample sizes n ∈ {2, . . . , 100}, we draw
250 random evidence samples. In panel (a), we plot the sample mean for the bias ∆µ = µˆ−µML against n.
In panel (b), we plot the sample mean for plaintiff probability to win θ˜ against n. In panel (c), we plot the
sample mean for variance of the court’s decision, Var(µˆ) = θ˜(1 − θ˜) (µP − µD )2 in equation (9), against n.
The horizontal axes are on a logarithmic scale.
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win rate is driven by competition between the parties.21332
In panel (c) of Figure 3, we plot the variance Var(µˆ) of the court’s decision333
as λ → ∞. The first part of the expression for the variance in equation (9)334
approaches 1/4 because θ˜ → 1/2. The second part of the expression approaches335
zero because both µ
P
→ µ
ML
and µ
D
→ µ
ML
. The reduction in variance will336
benefit risk averse parties, and potentially reduce the option value of suits337
(Bebchuk and Klement, 2012).338
Result 5. As the amount of evidence increases, n→∞, the court’s estimator339
converges in probability to the true µ = α/α+β, as do the models of the parties,340
µs → α/α+β for s = P,D.341
As the evidence sample size n increases, the maximum likelihood estimator342
converges in probability to the true mean µ = α/α+β of the Beta(α, β) process343
21Note, however, that because, for λ → ∞, the parties’ claims are the same, conver-
gence of the plaintiff’s probability to win when court noise disappears is without practical
consequence in our model.
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by the law of large numbers. Because the likelihood collapses onto α/α+β, the344
likelihood penalty (credibility cost) of deviating from α/α+β increases and the345
parties shade their models less, which implies that µs → α/α+β for s = P,D.346
We illustrate Result 5 in Figure 4. In panel (a), we plot the decision347
bias ∆µ = µˆ − µ
ML
against the evidence sample size n. The decision bias in348
this graph is the mean of the decision bias for 250 random evidence samples349
for each n, drawn from a Beta(1, 2) distribution. Decision bias disappears as350
both parties’ models converge to the mean for the evidence generating process,351
µ = α/α+β = 1/3.352
In panel (b) of Figure 4, we plot the probability of a plaintiff win as n→∞.353
In this case, the limit corresponds to 50% probability (i.e., θ˜ → 1/2). As the354
likelihood collapses, it becomes symmetric in a neighborhood around the true355
mean, so the parties choose locations equidistant from, and on either side of the356
true mean. Symmetry gives these equidistant locations the same likelihood,357
implying θ˜ → 1/2.22358
In panel (c) of Figure 4, we plot the variance Var(µˆ) of the court’s decision359
as n → ∞. The first part of the expression for the variance in equation (9)360
approaches 1/4 because θ˜ → 1/2 as n→∞. The second part of the expression361
for the variance Var(µˆ) approaches zero because both µs → α/α+β for s = P,D.362
The reduction in variance associated with better court decisions benefits risk-363
averse parties and can reduce the number of suits with a negative expected364
value.23365
22As with the convergence result for the noise parameter λ, because, for n → ∞, the
parties’ claims are the same, convergence of the plaintiff’s probability to win is without
practical consequence in our model.
23For a thorough discussion of negative-expected-value suits see Bebchuk and Klement
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4 Discussion366
In this paper, we model adversarial decision-making by turning scientific in-367
quiry upside down. Instead of objective truth seekers who formulate hypothe-368
ses and then gather evidence to test them, we study self-interested parties who369
strategically choose models to influence a decision-maker—after the evidence370
has already been produced and discovered. Nevertheless, we show that, under371
certain conditions, the decision-maker (e.g., a court) can still reach the best372
(most likely) interpretation of the evidence.373
We model court decision-making using the metaphor of statistical model374
selection, where models are proposed by interested parties. This metaphor is375
rich in that it allows us to identify conditions under which decision-making is376
likely to be biased away from the best explanation—even when decisions are377
based on evidence, as for instance in Pfeffer and Sutton (2006). The metaphor378
also suggests ways to mitigate bias, for example, by reducing court noise, or379
by increasing the amount of information available.380
Our work can be viewed as opening up the “black box” of court decision-381
making, as in Daughety and Reinganum (2000a), after all the evidence has382
been produced and discovered. As such, the model captures the trial sub-383
game that can be appended onto games of evidence production or revelation.24384
Whether and how this kind of strategic framing of the evidence would affect385
the outcome of the larger game is a question for future research.386
(2012).
24See Gilligan and Krehbiel (1997), Froeb and Kobayashi (1996, 2001, 2012), Daughety
and Reinganum (2000b), or Yilankaya (2002) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986), or Shin
(1994).
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In addition to the implications relating to litigation and arbitration, our387
model can be applied to the problem of delegating decision rights to subordi-388
nates who can end up disagreeing with one another or recommending opposing389
courses of action. Typically, managers higher up in the hierarchy are respon-390
sible for resolving these disagreements. Fama and Jensen (1983) call this the391
separation of “decision management” by subordinates from “decision control”392
by a superior. Our results suggest that, even if superiors resolve disagreements393
by appealing to evidence, the superior’s decisions are likely to be noisy and394
potentially biased if the alternatives are strategically chosen by subordinates.395
This can be thought of as another kind of agency cost.396
24
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Technical Appendix548
A The General Persuasion Game549
A.1 Introduction550
The results presented in the main text obviously depend on the specific dis-551
tribution chosen. In this appendix, we generalize the game to any arbitrary552
distribution. We use the generalized game to identify the properties of a dis-553
tribution (locations and likelihood) that give rise to our results.554
A.2 Problem555
We consider an unobservable evidence-generating process that is characterized556
by its theoretical mean. A principal is charged with making an assessment557
about the type of this unknown process. We assume that the principal does558
not have the capability or capacity to make her own assessment of the type.559
Instead, she solicits advice from agents with vested and opposing interests.560
The principal’s objective is to make the best possible assessment of the type561
of the process. She therefore follows the advice of the agent who is most562
credible, given a publicly observable sample drawn from the unknown process.563
We assume that the principal’s assessment of an agent’s advice is noisy so that564
her decision comes with error.565
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A.3 Notation566
We refer to the unknown process by its theoretical mean as type y ∈ R.567
A principal is charged with making an assessment yˆ ∈ R of the unknown568
type of the process. We denote by yˆ the principal’s decision in this game of569
persuasion. The principal’s objective is to make the best assessment given570
an available (and publicly observable) sample of evidence drawn according to571
the unknown process. We refer to the objectively best assessment as y¯. By572
assumption, the principal does not have access to this assessment but rather573
solicits advice from outside experts.574
The principal solicits advice from two agents, i = L,R. Each agent’s advice575
is modeled as an interpretation that characterizes the sample as coming from576
a process of type yi with credibility χi ≥ 0. The principal assesses the agents’577
advice and chooses the most credible of the two. We assume this assessment578
of credibility is noisy and refer to it as χ˜i = χi exp ξi for i = L,R, where ξi are579
independently extreme value (or Gumbel) distributed with mean 0 and scale580
1/λ.25 The principal therefore follows agent R’s advice if χ˜R > χ˜L and agent581
L’s otherwise. If χ˜L = χ˜R, then the principal flips a fair coin. This is akin to582
the structure of the logit choice model. The principal sides with agent R with583
probability584
θ˜ = Pr(χ˜R > χ˜L) =
exp(λ logχR)
exp(λ logχR) + exp(λ logχL)
=
χλR
χλR + χ
λ
L
. (A1)
25The structure in Jia (2008) is less restrictive, requiring the random variable ξi to belong
to the inverse exponential distribution.
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We define the incredibility of agent R’s advice as585
xR =
1
χλR
(A2)
and of agent L’s advice as586
xL = − 1
χλL
. (A3)
An agent’s advice strategy can thus be represented by a pair ai = (xi, yi) ∈ Ai587
with a proposed type yi ∈ R and an incredibility of that advice of xL ∈ R− for588
agent L and xL ∈ R+ for agent R. Because we measure agent L’s incredibility589
with a negative number, in (x, y)-space, agent L’s strategy space AL is to590
the left of the y-axis, whereas agent R’s strategy space AR is to the right of591
the y-axis. Advice located further from the y-axis is less credible (i.e., more592
incredible).593
We further limit the agent’s strategy space to be a compact and convex594
subset of R2 so that AL ⊂ R− × R and AR ⊂ R+ × R. We assume the set595
of feasible strategies is characterized by a type-credibility tradeoff. In other596
words, the further advice yi is from the objectively best assessment y¯, the597
less credible this advice will be with a value of χi, or, alternatively, the more598
incredible the advice will be with a higher value of |xi|. Extreme advice with599
very high (or low) type yi and low incredibility |xi| is therefore not feasible,600
and the strategy space is convex.601
Using the expressions for agent’s incredibility, the probability that the prin-602
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cipal follows agent R’s advice in equation (A1) can be rewritten as603
θ˜(xL, xR) =
xL
xR − xL . (A4)
The principal’s assessment of the process type is yR when she follows agent604
R’s advice and yL when she follows L’s advice. In expectations, the principal’s605
assessment26 and decision is thus606
yˆ(aL, aR) = θ˜(xL, xR)yR +
(
1− θ˜(xL, xR)
)
yL (A5)
=
xRyL − xLyR
xR − xL .
It is the credibility-weighted sum of the agent’s location advice.607
We can further rewrite the expression in equation (A5) as608
yˆ(aL, aR) = yL −m(aL, aR)xL = yR −m(aL, aR)xR (A6)
where609
m(aL, aR) =
yR − yL
xR − xL (A7)
is the slope of the line connecting the two points aL = (xL, yL) and aR =610
(xR, yR) in (x, y)-space.611
The two agents have vested and opposing interests. We assume that the612
26This expected assessment yˆ is also the outcome of a decision-maker who minimizes
a quadratic loss function −wR (yR − yˆ)2 − wL (yL − yˆ)2, that is, the weighted sum of the
squared deviations of assessment yˆ from the agent’s proposed types yi.
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agents’ payoffs are directly affected by the principal’s assessment of type.613
Agent L prefers low values of yˆ, whereas agent R prefers high values. For given614
yR > yL, the expression for the principal’s expected decision in equation (A5)615
implies that both agents will choose the most credible interpretations given616
their advice types yi. For agent L, this means the highest possible xL ∈ R−;617
and for agent R the lowest possible xR ∈ R+. We define these “incredibility618
frontiers” as619
xˆL(yL, ·) = max {x : (x, yL) ∈ AL} (A8)
and620
xˆR(yR, ·) = min {x : (x, yR) ∈ AR} (A9)
where aL = (xˆL(y), y) dominates any other strategy for agent L with a given621
y value, and similarly for aR = (xˆR(y), y). These incredibility frontiers are the622
hulls of Ai facing the y-axis in (x, y)-space.623
An incredibility frontier xˆi(yi, ·) depends on the agent’s advice type yi as624
well as environmental characteristics (e.g., evidence sample, a potential prior625
bias by the principal, the noise parameter λ, or the expertise of the agent)626
captured by the properties of the agent’s strategy space Ai. This strategy627
space Ai and thus the agent’s incredibility frontier does not depend on the628
other agent’s strategy.629
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A.4 Equilibrium Concept630
A persuasion game is a simultaneous-move, non-cooperative game between631
two agents i = L,R providing strategic advice ai ∈ Ai to maximize payoffs632
piL = −yˆ(aL, aR) for agent L and piR = yˆ(aL, aR) for agent R with yˆ(aL, aR)633
defined in equation (A6). A Nash equilibrium in this game is a strategy profile634
(a∗L, a
∗
R) such that635
yˆ(a∗L, a
∗
R) ≤ yˆ(aL, a∗R) ∀aL ∈ AL for agent L
yˆ(a∗L, a
∗
R) ≥ yˆ(a∗L, aR) ∀aR ∈ AR for agent R
 . (A10)
From the expression for the principal’s decision in equation (A6), we can636
conclude that, because agent L’s incredibility is by definition negative, xL < 0,637
if m(a′L, a
′
R) > m(aL, aR), then either m(a
′
L, aR) > m(aL, aR) or m(aL, a
′
R) >638
m(aL, aR). In other words, if a strategy profile (aL, aR) does not result in a639
maximum for m, at least one of the agents can unilaterally move to increase640
the slope.641
Lemma A1. Both agents present advice ai to maximize the slope m(aL, aR).642
An immediate implication of Lemma A1 is that, if it exists, a Nash equi-643
librium (a∗L, a
∗
R) in this game determines a line of maximum slope m(a
∗
L, a
∗
R).644
A.5 Equilibrium Results645
In the sequel, we present our main results from the general persuasion game646
and relate them back to the model presented in the main text of the paper.647
37
A.5.1 Nash Equilibrium648
By Lemma A1, in equilibrium, the advice strategy profile (a∗L, a
∗
R) ∈ AL ×AR649
will be such that slope m(aL, aR) is maximized. As AL is all on or above the650
line with slope m connecting aL and aR, and AR is all on or below that line,651
it follows that there is a unique line with this maximum slope, m∗. Agents652
L and R can choose any points along this line in AL and AR, or any mixed653
strategies between such points (as a mixture of pure strategies), but the value654
of the game yˆ∗ ≡ yˆ(a∗L, a∗R) is the y-intercept of the line of maximum slope655
between the choice sets. We summarize these results in Theorem A1.656
Theorem A1. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the persuasion game will657
exist if, and only if, the slope function m(aL, aR) has a maximum value on658
AL × AR, that is, when there is a unique common line of support below AL659
and above AR. If this line meets AL or AR in more than one point, then there660
are also mixed strategy equilibria that are mixtures of pure strategies along this661
line, and result in the same assessment yˆ for the game.662
Two properties of this result are worth mentioning. First, if the projections663
of AL and AR onto the y-axis are bounded, then there is a maximum slope664
line. More generally, if a line of positive slope cuts off a bounded region of665
AL below the line and a bounded region of AR above the line, then there is a666
maximum slope line. This is true if the incredibility grows faster than linearly667
for large positive and large negative values.668
Second, if xˆL and xˆR are strictly concave, differentiable functions, de-669
fined on a convex subset of the real line, with unbounded derivatives, then670
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these functions have unique maxima and minima, respectively, and define671
the relevant frontiers of the strategy sets. These assumptions also guaran-672
tee the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium solution a∗L = (xˆL(y
∗
L), y
∗
L) and673
a∗R = (xˆR(y
∗
R), y
∗
R), and the line through these points is simultaneously tangent674
to both the L and R curves.675
In Figure A1, we relate the general game to our litigation game in the676
main test by using the specific parameterization of the game in the main677
text. The unobservable type is the theoretical mean of the Beta(α, β) dis-678
tribution, y = µ, and the inverse credibility is the reciprocal likelihood or679
“incredibility,” x = 1/L λ. Agent L is the defendant D (preferring low-680
valued outcomes) and agent R is the plaintiff (preferring high-valued out-681
comes), where AL is the set
(−1/L λD, µD) and AR is the set (1/L λP , µP ), both682
defined over all possible Beta(α, β) distribution functions. This means, there683
are multiple parameterizations to obtain a fixed µ = α/ (α + β) and varying684
σ2 = µ (1− µ) / (1 + α + β). Alternatively, there are multiple parameteriza-685
tions (and thus likelihoods) to obtain a fixed σ2 and varying µ (Leonard and686
Hsu, 1999).687
With this set up, the x-axis in Figure A1 measures incredibility 1/L λ as688
a function of the type µ plotted on the y-axis. The dashed lines represent the689
reciprocal likelihoods of various types, for various fixed values of variance σ2.690
This gives a family of overlapping curves, the envelope of which is also drawn,691
and whose union defines the AR set to the right, and which is mirrored in the692
AL set to the left. The line of maximum slope is drawn between the points693
in these sets, defining the optimal advice strategies for the two sides. The694
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Figure A1: Advice in the Simple Litigation Game
In Figure A1, we illustrate the geometrical characterization of the agents’ equilibrium strategies. Choice set
AL for agent L is to the left of the vertical axis; choice set AR for agent R is to the right of the axis. Each
dashed line represents the reciprocal likelihood for varying proposed type y, holding the variance fixed. The
solid curve represents the envelope of the family of these overlapping curves. The bullet point on the vertical
axis represents the equilibrium decision yˆ. The bullet points on the envelopes of AL and AR represent the
agents’ advice a∗i . The most credible type y¯ is marked by the horizontal line between the peaks of the
envelopes of AL and AR.
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1/L λ = “incredibility”
µ = “type”
y-intercept of the line is denoted by a dot on the vertical axis. It represents695
the equilibrium assessment yˆ∗ of the game. This assessment is slightly above696
the maximum likelihood (i.e., minimum incredibility) value y¯, marked by a697
horizontal line between the “peaks” of the two sets, AL and AR.698
A.5.2 Payoff Shading699
We have denoted the objectively best assessment of the type as y¯. Suppose that700
this type y¯ is also the most credible advice the agents can give. That means, the701
maximum of xˆL < 0 and the minimum of xˆR > 0 (i.e., the points where these702
40
come closest to the y-axis) are at the same y¯. This then implies that that the703
strategy (xˆL(yL), yL) for L with yL > y¯ is dominated by (xˆL(y¯), y¯). Similarly,704
a strategy (xˆR(yR), yR) for R with yR < y¯ is dominated by (xˆR(y¯), y¯). Because705
the incredibility functions xˆi cannot be differentiable and have a corner at y¯,706
agents will “shade” their advice, with L offering a type y∗L less than the most707
likely y¯, and R offering a type y∗R greater than this y¯.708
Theorem A2. In equilibrium, the agents shade and present advice a∗i with709
types y∗i on either side of the most credible type y¯. The Nash equilibrium710
advice strategies with proposed types y∗L and y
∗
R satisfy y
∗
L < y¯ < y
∗
R.711
The result in Theorem A2 is analogous to Result 1 in the main text. The712
agents shade their advice in their favor. Moreover, if the incredibility functions713
xˆi are strictly concave with |xˆi(y)| > |xˆi(y¯)| increasing in |y − y¯|, then the714
equilibrium types presented by the agents are finite, y∗L > −∞ and y∗R < ∞.715
The agents therefore engage in payoff moderation (Konrad, 2009).716
A.5.3 Bias717
If the shape of the incredibility function is not symmetric about the most718
credible y¯, but instead favors one side over the other with less incredibility719
for equal offsets from y¯, then the equilibrium assessment will be biased from y¯720
in the direction of that side. In other words, |yˆ∗ − y¯| > 0. We illustrate this721
in Figure A1 where the likelihood function for the litigation game example722
decreases more slowly for Beta(α, β) distributions having µ greater than the723
maximum likelihood estimate (y¯ = µ
ML
) than it does for µ less than this value.724
Heuristically, if the evidence is closer to the lower range of the Beta(α, β)725
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distribution, then there is more “room” to explain the evidence with a larger726
µ than with a smaller µ.727
It may be that the principal holds a biased prior or that there are differences728
in the capabilities of the agents such that one side offering the theory with type729
y¯ would be viewed more favorably than the other offering what should amount730
to the same most credible theory. We set aside this sort of asymmetry between731
the sides and assume:732
xˆL(y¯) = −xˆR(y¯). (A11)
This assumption means that either player can offer up this best theory with733
the same resulting weight. It implies that the identity of the agent does not734
matter735
Because, by Theorem A2, agent L shades down, yL < y¯, and agent R shades736
up, yR > y¯, values of xˆL for yL > y¯ and values of xˆR for yR < y¯ are observed737
only off equilibrium. For the properties of the equilibrium decision yˆ∗ we can738
therefore ignore these values. This means that we may as well take a single739
function xˆ describing both parties’ incredibility functions: xˆ(y) = −xˆL(y) for740
y ≤ y¯ and xˆ(y) = xˆR(y) for y ≥ y¯. The bias of the principal’s decision relative741
to y¯ is then determined by how quickly the incredibility increases for y > y¯ as742
compared to y < y¯ as a function of the difference from the most credible type743
y¯. In Theorem A3 below, we make use of the following definitions:744
Definition A1 (Symmetry). The incredibility function xˆ(y) is symmetric745
about y = y¯ if, for every δ > 0, xˆ(y¯ − δ) = xˆ(y¯ + δ).746
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Definition A2 (Credibility Costs). Agent L has lower credibility costs in xˆ747
(and agent R has higher credibility costs) if, for every δ > 0, xˆ(y¯−δ) < xˆ(y¯+δ);748
that is, advice aL with type shaded down by δ is more credible than advice aR749
with type shaded up by an equal amount δ. Analogously for agent R.750
Definition A3 (Monotonic Credibility Costs). Agent L has monotonically751
lower credibility costs (and agent R has monotonically higher credibility costs)752
if xˆ(y¯ + δ)− xˆ(y¯ − δ) is a strictly increasing function for δ > 0. Analogously753
for agent R.754
Theorem A3. For the general persuasion game with equilibrium strategies755
a∗L = (−xˆ(y∗L), y∗L) and a∗R = (xˆ(y∗R), y∗R) and equilibrium assessment yˆ∗ =756
yˆ(a∗L, a
∗
R), the following bias properties hold:757
1. If xˆ(y) is symmetric, then y∗R − y¯ = y¯ − y∗L and yˆ∗ = y¯.758
2. If agent L has lower credibility costs, then yˆ∗ < y¯, and the equilibrium759
assessment is biased down. If agent R has lower credibility costs, then760
yˆ∗ > y¯, and the equilibrium assessment is biased up.761
3. If agent L has monotonically lower credibility costs, then agent L’s ad-762
vice a∗L exhibits more shading than agent R’s advice, y¯ − y∗L > y∗R − y¯.763
Analogously for agent R.764
Proof. 1. Suppose xˆ(y) is symmetric (Definition A1). If y∗R = y¯ + δ, then765
for y′L = y¯ − δ and a′L = (−xˆ(y′L), y′L), xˆ(y′L) = xˆ(y∗R) so that yˆ∗ ≤766
yˆ(a′L, a
∗
R) = y¯ since L can do no worse than respond to a
∗
R with strategy767
a′L. Similarly if y
∗
L = y¯ − δ, taking y′R = y¯ + δ shows yˆ∗ ≥ y¯. Hence768
yˆ∗ = y¯, and the same δ = y∗R − y¯ = y¯ − y∗L.769
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2. With lower credibility costs (Definition A2) for agent L, xˆ(y¯ − δ) <770
xˆ(y¯ + δ) for all δ > 0. If y∗R = y¯ + δ, then take y
′
L = y¯ − δ and771
a′L = (−xˆ(y′L), y′L). Because xˆ(y¯ − δ) < xˆ(y¯ + δ), yˆ∗ ≤ yˆ(a′L, a∗R) < y¯.772
Analogously for agent R.773
3. With monotonically lower credibility costs (Definition A3) for agent L,774
xˆ(y¯ + δ) − xˆ(y¯ − δ) is strictly increasing. Then, for δ = y∗R − y¯, the775
derivative −xˆ′(y¯ − δ) < xˆ′(y¯ + δ) = xˆ′(y∗R) = −xˆ′(y∗L) because the max-776
imum slope line is tangent to both incredibility curves at the equilib-777
rium solution. But xˆ′(y) is strictly increasing so y∗L < y¯ − δ, that is,778
δ = y∗R − y¯ < y¯ − y∗L. The analogous arguments hold when R has lower779
credibility costs. Q.E.D.780
A.5.4 Convergence as n→∞781
The illustration in Figure A1 is based on an evidence sample with only two782
values: z¯ = (1/5, 1/2). In other words, there is not a lot of evidence constraining783
the agents’ advice. With more evidence, the likelihood function has a narrower784
peak, so advice away from the maximum likelihood become much less credible.785
In general, as the sample size n increases, we expect the credibility function xˆ786
to collapse on y¯ for the true process generating the evidence.787
More specifically, suppose a family of incredibility functions denoted by788
xˆ(y|n) are parameterized by a variable n denoting the amount of evidence789
available. Suppose that the most credible y¯ is the same for all incredibility790
functions xˆ(y|n). Scaling the incredibility by a constant factor does nothing to791
change the outcome of the game. We thus assume that these functions are all792
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normalized to one, xˆ(y¯|n) = 1. The notion of narrowing incredibility functions793
is then captured formally as a hypothesis of the following consistency result.794
Theorem A4. Let the equilibrium assessment in the persuasion game with795
incredibility function xˆ(y|n) be denoted by yˆ∗n. Suppose that for every  > 0,796
for all sufficiently large n, and any y we have xˆ(y|n) > |y − y¯|/. Then797
lim
n→∞
yˆ∗n = y¯.798
Proof. Suppose  > 0 is given and take N so for all n ≥ N and any y we799
have xˆ(y|n) > |y − y¯|/. Let a∗L = (xˆ(y∗L|n), y∗L) and a∗R = (xˆ(y∗R|n), y∗R) be800
equilibrium strategies for the persuasion game with xˆ(y|n). Let a′L = (−1, y¯)801
be the maximally credible strategy for agent L. Then802
yˆ∗n = yˆ(a
∗
L, a
∗
R) ≤ yˆ(a′L, a∗R) =
xˆ(yˆ∗|n)y¯ + yˆ∗
xˆ(yˆ∗|n) + 1 < y¯ +
yˆ∗ − y¯
xˆ(yˆ∗|n) < y¯ + .
On the other hand, taking a′R = (1, y¯) shows yˆ
∗
n ≥ yˆ(a∗L, a′R) > y¯−  in similar803
fashion. Hence, for every  > 0, for all sufficiently large n, |yˆ∗n − y¯| < , that804
is, lim
n→∞
yˆ∗n = y¯. Q.E.D.805
This result is stronger than what we illustrate with Result 5 in the main text806
where we show that the bias decreases with more evidence. In Theorem A4,807
we show that the equilibrium assessment converges to the most credible assess-808
ment y¯. In other words, any bias in assessments away from the most credible809
y¯ due to the adversarial process disappears with increasing evidence. Advice810
that deviates from the most credible explanation simply faces an increasing811
credibility penalty the more evidence there is. The argument gives a bound for812
45
the deviation of yˆ∗n from y¯, but the argument cannot tell us that this bias de-813
creases monotonically with n without much more detailed assumptions about814
the dependence of xˆ(y|n) on n.815
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